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North Carolina's Import-Export Property Taxation
Classification Statute:
A Question of Constitutionality
by Edmund Pickup, Jr.*
The North Carolina legislature has classified certain property for
exemption from listing, appraisal, assessment, or taxation by the state.
Among these classes of property are certain goods which are stored
awaiting shipment to a foreign country, and certain goods which have
been imported through a North Carolina seaport and which are stored
and awaiting further shipment.1 This article supports the position that
this statute places a discriminatory ad valorem tax burden on goods
that are imported through ports located outside of North Carolina and
which are thereafter stored in North Carolina, or goods which have
been stored in North Carolina and thereafter exported through parts of
other states; therefore, the statute violates both the commerce clause
2
and the import-export clause 3 and is invalid. Additionally, the article
will briefly explore actions which can be taken to challenge the statute,
standing to bring these actions, and potential defendants in an action
to invalidate the statute.
A. The Statute: Its Workings, History, and Interpretation
The selection and classification of property which will be taxed is a
proper exercise of the taxing authority of the North Carolina General
Assembly. In the case of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-275, the General
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-275 (1) & (2) (Cum. Supp. 1975) states: Property
classified and excluded from the tax base. - The following classes of property are
hereby designated special classes under authority of Article V, Sec. 2(2), of the North
Carolina Constitution and shall not be listed, appraised, assessed, or taxed:
(1) Cotton, tobacco, other farm products, goods, wares, and merchandise held or
stored for shipment to any foreign country, except any such products, goods, wares,
and mechandise that have been so stored for more than 12 months on the date as of
which property is listed for taxation. Such property shall be listed (by quantity only,
and with a statement that it is being held for export) in the county in which it is located
on the tax listing date, but shall not be assessed or taxed. On the next tax listing date,
any such property which has not been exported shall be listed, assessed and taxed in
the same manner as other taxable property. (The purpose of this classification is to
encourage the development of the ports of North Carolina.)
(2) Tangible personal property that has been imported from a foreign country
through a North Carolina seaport terminal and which is stored at such a terminal
while awaiting further shipment - for the first 12 months of such storage. (The
purpose of this classification is to encourage the development of the ports of this
State.)
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.3.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl.2.
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Assembly "described the categories excluded from, rather than those
included in, the [tax] base."'4 This power to classify taxable property
was examined in Rigby v. Clayton5 where the executrix of an estate
claimed that the North Carolina inheritance tax violated her due
process and equal protection rights since it classified a non-resident
decedent's estate containing property located entirely outside of North
Carolina differently from a non-resident decedent's estate containing
property located both within and outside of the state. The court upheld
the statute stating:
The Legislature is given the widest latitude in making the distinctions
which are bases for classification, and they will not be disturbed unless
they are capricious, arbitrary, and unjustified by reason. [citation omit-
ted] Nor will occasional inequalities and hardships resulting from the
application of the statute defeat the law unless it be shown that they result
from hostile discrimination.
6
N.C. Gen. Stat. §105-275 must, therefore, be analyzed with the
legislature's very broad classification powers in mind.
The first subsection of the statute classifies as non-taxable certain
personal property held or stored for shipment to a foreign country for
twelve months or less from the date that it is listed for taxation. Such
property includes cotton, tobacco, farm products, goods, wares, and
merchandise. This subsection has been subjected to much legislative
tinkering since its conception as the second paragraph of the former
§105-281. 7 That section was unsatisfactory because it had been phrased
as an exemption to a general property tax rather than as a classification
to a classified property tax.
Illustrative of the apparent difficulty that the legislature has had in
redrafting the statute, the short-lived 1971 revision provided that the
purpose of the classification was to encourage the development of the
ports of North Carolina. However, inconsistent with that purpose,
Subsection (1) did not specify that the goods must be exported through
a North Carolina port in order to obtain the non-taxable classification.
A 1973 amendment 9 required export through a North Carolina
port, but never became effective because it would have been overly-
complex to administer:
It require[d] the owner of the property within the class to list it during the
regular listing period, identifying it at that time for valuation separate
from other property he may list. Thereafter, the property designated for
4 H. LEWIS, THE ANNOTATED MACHINERY ACT OF 1971 at 10 (1971).
5 274 N.C. 465, 164 S.E.2d 7 (1968).
6 274 N.C. at 470, 164 S.E.2d at 11.
71961 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.1169, §8, repealed by 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.695, §10.
8 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.806, §1.
9 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.695, §1.
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export [was to be] treated for appraisal, billing and collection purposes as
if it were taxable, but if it [was] in fact shipped in accordance with the
statute's requirements, the owner [was to. be] entitled... to a release of
the taxing unit's claim for taxes levied on the exported property. If the tax
[had] already been paid when the statute's requirements [were] met, the
person who paid the tax [was] entitled to a refund. 10
The present export statute" does not explicitly require export
through a North Carolina port; however, it requires that the property
be listed in the county in which it is located on tax date but not
assessed or taxed. On the next tax listing date, if the property has not
been exported, it is taxed like any other tangible personalty. Whether
the subsection impliedly requires export through a North Carolina port
may be determinative of its constitutionality.
The second subsection classifies tangible personal property im-
ported from a foreign country through a North Carolina seaport
terminal as non-taxable for the first twelve months of its storage in
North Carolina. Although the wording of this subsection has been
frequently changed since its conception, 12 the subsection has remained
substantively constant.
B. Commerce Clause: "The Congress shall have the Power To... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."13
Goods stored in a North Carolina warehouse are a part of the
general mass of property within the state, and the commerce clause is
not an obstacle to their taxation under a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax. Once the goods are stored, North Carolina's power to tax
is 7t limited by the fact that the goods were imported through a port
of a ther state. Davenport v. Ralph N. Peters & Co. '4 applied the above
prin ,le. There, the tax collector for the city of Charlotte and
Mecklenburg County sued to recover ad valorem property taxes on
cottonseed oil which had been brought into North Carolina from
another state and which was stored in the taxing unit. The court found
the broker liable for payment of the tax since he held the negotiable
warehouse receipt and had failed to declare the oil. "... [IUnterstate
movement was sufficiently interrupted when the oil was stored in
Charlotte that it lost the immunity acquired by property in transit and
became subject to state taxation.' 5 The court cited Minnesota v. Blasius:
10 H. LEWIS, supra note 4 at 8 (1973 Supp.).
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-275(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
12 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1169, §8.
13 U.S. CONST. art.I, §8, cl.3.
14 274 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.C.1966), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 199 (4th
Cir. 1967).
15 Id. at 113.
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Where property has come to rest within a state, being held there at
the pleasure of the owner, for disposal or use, so that he may dispose of it
either within the state, or for shipment elsewhere, as his interest dictates,
it is deemed to be a part of the general mass of property within the state
and is thus subject to its taxing power. 16
This statement reflects a policy that the commerce clause should not be
applied to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their just
share of state tax burdens merely because the tax increases their costs
of doing business. 17
In addition to the qualification that goods must have come to rest,
the state's power to tax is limited under the commerce clause by a
requirement that the tax not be discriminatory. As stated by the United
States Supreme Court in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co.:
It is only when the [state] tax operates to regulate commerce between,
the states or with foreign nations to an extent which infringes the"
authority conferred upon Congress,. that the tax can be said to exceed
constitutional limitations. [citations omitted] Forms of state taxation
whose tendency is to prohibit the commerce or place it at a disadvantage
as compared or in competition with intrastate commerce, are familiar
examples of the exercise of state taxing power in an unconstitutional
manner.. 1s
The decisions, despite formalistic distinctions between cases, incorpo-
rate a practical judgment of the likelihood that the tax might be used to
place interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage. 19
Thus a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax could be placed
on any property in storage in a North Carolina warehouse regardless of
whether the property was imported or exported through a North
Carolina port. The North Carolina General Assembly has chosen to
classify property as non-taxable for one year if it has been imported
through a North Carolina seaport. If it is imported through one of the
seaports of a sister state, but stored in North Carolina, it is clearly
outside of the classification and is taxable.
Although the statute does not so specify, this author contends that
stored property held for export must be exported through a North
Carolina port in order to receive the non-taxable classification. The
self-proclaimed purpose of the statute is to promote the development
of ports in North Carolina. If the statute were interpreted as affording
16 290 U.S. 1, 9 (1933).
17 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 (1940).
18 Id. at 45. The McGoldrick case involved a challenge to a retail sales tax imposed
by New York regardless of whether the items in question had traveled in interstate
commerce. The Court upheld this tax as nondiscriminatory, and found no reason to
distinguish between this type of sales tax and a tax on the property itself. Id. at 52. See
also O'Kane v. New York, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E.2d 905 (1940).
19 309 U.S. at 45 n.2.
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the classification to stored goods exported through any port, the
statute would not carry out that purpose. Secondly, the former
statute20 expressly required the property to be exported through a
North Carolina port. Finally, the import subsection, 21 written in
tandem with the export subsection, requires that the goods be im-
ported through a North Carolina port; it also states that its purpose is
to encourage the development of North Carolina ports. Prior to 1971,
both the import and export subsections were combined in one parag-
raph of a former statute.22 Thus, the two subsections are from the same
source and have the same purpose; they should be similarly construed.
However, it is possible that the export subsection could be
interpreted so as to afford the tax-free classification to all stored goods
regardless of whether or not their anticipated port of departure is
located in North Carolina. In Nesbitt v. Gill 23 the North Carolina
Supreme Court construed a tax statute which the taxpayer claimed was
in violation of the commerce clause. That statute placed a tax on every
person, firm, or corporation in the bitsiness of purchasing horses or
mules for resale. The tax was measured by the number of such animals
that the dealer received in the state. The taxpayer claimed that since
* the tax did not become due until the dealer received the animals within
the state, it discriminated against interstate commerce according to the
origin of the animal. Construing the statute to apply with equal force to
purchases made within the state, the court found the tax nondis-
criminatory: "It simply means a dealer is not required to pay the tax
when he purchases horses and/or mules for resale until such animals
come into his possession within the state, regardless of the date of
purchase or the origin of the shipment. '24 The court's holding was
based on the rule of construction that if a statute is susceptible of two
interpretations, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the
former interpretation will be preferred.
In light of its stated purpose, prior wording, and close relationship
with the import classification statute, it is difficult to maintain the
construction that the present export classification statute does not
require the stored goods to be exported through a North Carolina port
in order to obtain the non-taxable classification. Moreover, even if the
export classification subsection is given that construction, the corres-
ponding import classification subsection specifies that it is to apply
only to goods imported through North Carolina seaports.
Assuming that the effect of both subsections is not to tax stored
goods imported or exported through a North Carolina port, but to tax
20 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.695, §1.
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. §105-275(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
22 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 806, §1.
23 227 N.C. 174, 41 S.E.2d 646 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 332 U.S. 749 (1947).
24 Nesbitt v. Gill, 227 N.C. 174, 180, 41 S.E.2d 646, 651 (1947).
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similar goods which have been imported or will be exported through
another port, then interstate commerce is placed at a competitive
disadvantage with intrastate commerce. Thus, under the McGoldrick
standards, discussed supra, the statute exceeds the state's constitu-
tional limitations.
The United States Supreme Court in Best & Co. v. Maxwell 25
invalidated a North Carolina privilege tax on sellers who were not
regular retail merchants in North Carolina, regardless of whether they
were residents or non-residents, because of its discriminatory effect:
The commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or
ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute
under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical operation
work discrimination against interstate commerce.
26
The practical operation of North Carolina's import-export classifi-
cation statute on the businesses importing or exporting goods through-
ports of other states but storing them in North Carolina is difficult to
determine. It should be noted that in Best & Co., the Court analyzed the
practical effect of the statute, looking beyond the fact that it was
nondiscriminatory on its face. The Court assumed that "those North
Carolina residents competing with appellant [a non-resident retail
merchant] for the sale of similar merchandise will normally be regular
retail merchants. ' 27 Without this assumption, there would be no
discriminatory effect of the statute involved in Best & Co. It would be as
difficult to obtain adequate numerical data on the effect of the import-
export classification statute as it would have been to obtain such data
on the effect of the statute in Best & Co. Perhaps, in light of the Best &
Co. assumption, a court examing the constitutionality of the import-
export classification statute would be willing to look to the probable
practical effect without demanding exact numerical calculations as to
the actual effect of the statute - at least if such calculations would be
difficult to obtain.
A tax levied solely on property in interstate commerce and
discriminatory on its face may be found non-discriminatory in effect if
it is a substitute for an equivalent tax placed solely on intrastate
commerce. For example, in Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 28 South Carolina
placed a license tax of six cents per gallon on petroleum products
brought into and stored in the state. As the tax applied only to
25 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
26 Id. at 455-56. See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (criminal
conviction for engaging in business as a sales solicitor reversed as discriminatory
against interstate commerce in effect rather than in language); see Memphis Steam
Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (Mississippi tax on person not licensed in state
who solicits laundry in state with a lesser tax on in-state laundries invalid under
commerce clause).
27 311 U.S. at 456.
28 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
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petroleum purchased outside of the state and brought into the state, it
appeared to be a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. The
United States Supreme Court held that the existence of a separate,
similar tax levied upon persons buying or producing petroleum within
the state made the statute nondiscriminatory. "There is no demand in
the Constitution that the state shall put its requirements in any one
statute. It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its
totality, is within the State's constitutional power."
'29
Similarly, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company v. Townships of Au-
stin, Millbrook and Hinton30 held that an ad valorem personal property
tax on natural gas brought into and stored in Michigan was not
discriminatory even though it exempted Michigan gas. The court
reasoned that since Michigan gas was subject to a severance tax which
was not applicable to interstate gas, there was no discriminatory
effect. 1
The present import-export classification statute fails to meet the
exculpating test. With respect to stored goods imported or exported
through North Carolina ports, no tax exists in the North Carolina tax
system to offset the tax burden borne.by stored goods imported or
exported through ports in other states.
The import-export statute is no less discriminatory because it is
worded as an exemption from taxation for goods imported or exported
through North Carolina ports, rather than as a tax only on stored
goods previously imported or to be exported through other ports. In
Opinion of the Justices,32 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire re-
sponded to the questions of their legislature concerning a barrel tax on
refined petroleum products produced in the state with an exemption
for products produced for distribution in New Hampshire. The court
held that any crude oil which came to rest in New Hampshire during
the refining process could be taxed by the state without violation of the
commerce clause. However, the court stated that whether the exemp-
tion would render the tax discriminatory was a question "within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the last instance," and that it could
not assure that the exemption would be permissible under the federal
Constitution. 33 The Refined Petroleum Products Tax Act, as passed by
the New Hampshire legislature, does not include the questioned
exemption. 3
4
The effect of the North Carolina import-export classification sta-
tute is very similar to the effect of the proposed exemption in Opinion of
29 Id. at 480.
30 373 Mich. 123, 128 N.W.2d 491 (1964).
31 Id; -at 144, 128 N.W.2d at 502.
32 114.N.H.;174, 317 A.2d 568 (1974).
33 Id. at 179, 317 A.2d at 571.
34 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§78-C:1-:12 (Supp. 1975)
20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
the Justices. The New Hampshire provision would have taxed barrels of
petroleum to be distributed outside of New Hampshire's intrastate
commerce on an ad valorem basis, while exempting identical barrels
distributed in New Hampshire. North Carolina taxes stored goods
imported or exported through out-of-state ports while, in effect, it
exempts identical goods imported or exported using North Carolina's
intrastate commerce. Both "exemptions" encourage the development
of industries within their states at the expense of industries outside of
their states.
C. Import-Export Clause: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress,
lay any Imports or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws..."3s
Since the North Carolina import-export classification statute
applies only to stored goods imported from or exported to foreign.
countries, the import-export clause becomes relevant. Unlike the
commerce clause, the import-export clause refers solely to goods
brought from or carried to foreign countries, and not to goods
transported from one state to another.
36
The Import-Export clause and the Commerce clause, while related,
are not coterminous. There are two important differences between the
two clauses. First, the Import-Export clause prohibits taxation by the
states on the import or export, while the application of the Commerce
clause has no relationship to whether an article was or ever has been, an
import or export. Second, the Commerce clause is not cast in terms of a
prohibition against taxes but in terms of power of the Congress to regulate
commerce. 37
C-1. Imports
Until January of 1976, the definitive case interpreting the import-
export clause was Low v. Austin, decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1871.38 In Low, the Court established the principle that the
import-export clause clearly prohibited states from assessing any ad
valorem property tax on imported goods until such time as the goods
lost their import status and became part of the general mass of
property in the state. However, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 39 the
United States Supreme Court dramatically changed its prior interpreta-
tion of the import-export clause from an absolute prohibition of taxes
on imports to a prohibition of discriminatory taxation of imports.
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
36 Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 628 (1885).
37 City of Farmers Bank v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 527 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975).
38 Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
39 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
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In Michelin, the taxpayer manufactured tires and innertubes in
France and Canada and imported the products into Georgia for
warehousing and distribution. The tax commissioner of the county
where the imported goods were held assessed ad valorem property
taxes against the tires and tubes. The Supreme Court of Georgia held
that those tubes which were still in the original packages in which they
were imported were immunized from taxation by the import-export
clause, but that the tires which had been mingled with other tires and
whose sale had been arranged were part of the general mass of
property in the state and thus were taxable by the state.
The United States Supreme Court held in Michelin that the
purposes of the import-export clause were: to assure that the federal
government had the exclusive right to regulate foreign commerce, to
receive all of the revenue from duties, and to maintain the free flow of
foreign goods among all the states by prohibiting the imposition of
taxes by states through which imports and exports were likely to flow.
The Court proceeded to hold that, as long as these purposes are
fulfilled, the clause does not absolutely prohibit state taxation of
imported goods:
.Nothing in the history of the Import-Export Clause even remotely
suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax which is also
imposed on imported goods that are no longer in import transit was the
te of exaction that was regarded as objectionable by the Framers of the
onstitution. For such an exaction, unlike discriminatory state taxation
against imported goods as imports, was not regarded as an impediment
that severly hampered commerce.. 4o
Thus, the Court, per Justice Brennan, held that nondiscriminatory
taxes on imports do not violate the purposes of the import-export
clause. Admittedly, the Court was referring primarily to ad valorem
property taxes which discriminate against all stored imports in favor of
all stored non-imports. As shown in the commerce clause discussion,
North Carolina's import classification statute discriminates against
stored goods imported through ports outside of North Carolina and
non-imported stored goods, in favor of stored goods imported through
North Carolina ports. Since the Michelin decision is predicated on the
policy for which the import-export clause was adopted, the question of
whether Michelin's holding extends to North Carolina's import classifi-
cation statute likewise depends on whether the effect of the stature
violates the purposes of the import-export clause.
One of the purposes of the import-export clause examined in
Michelin is that the free flow of imported goods among the states not be
impeded.41 This purpose is not offended simply because the impact of
a tax is to increase the cost of imported goods purchased by consumers;
40 Id. at 541.
41 Id. at 542.
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the ultimate consumers should assume the burden of paying for the
police and fire protection and similar services which benefitted the
goods, just as they pay for the transportation costs associated with the
goods. 42 Thus while goods may be taxed in order to compensate the
state for its police services, the tax may not be imposed in a manner
which would otherwise impede the flow of foreign commerce. Under
the North Carolina tax, goods imported through ports in other states
must bear costs not borne by goods imported through North Carolina
ports. This inhibits the free flow of imported goods from the other
states into North Carolina just as certainly as the pre-Constitution
practice engaged in by port states (such as Virginia and South Caroli-
na) of taxing imports sent to non-port states (like North Carolina)- a
practice which, as the court points out, led to the inclusion of the
import-export clause in the United States Constitution. 43 Thus, the
import classification statute violates one of the purposes for the
import-export clause and, consequently, violates the import-export
clause itself.
The extent to which existing law concerning imports was changed
by Michelin is open to question since there are no reported cases
interpreting Michelin at this time. There is some question as to whether
imported goods stored in warehouses retain their classification as
imports. In Hooven and Allison Co. v. Evatt, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
[T]his Court has held, without a dissenting voice, that things im-
ported are imports entitled to the immunity conferred by the Constitu-
tion; that the immunity survives their arrival in this country and con-
tinues until they are sold, removed from the original package, or put to
the use for which they are imported.
44
In Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers, this pre-Michelin test was
also stated to be applicable when imported goods are put to the use for
which they were imported; at such time, they cease to be imports and
their tax exemption is at an end.45 The Youngstown Court found that the
taxpayers had acted on the imported goods by irrevocably committing
them to use in manufacturing after their journey had ended; although
the goods were stored, they were available for the daily operational
needs of the taxpayer's business. The Court distinguished cases where
the goods were stored in a warehouse and intended for eventual use in
manufacturing but were not essential to current operational needs. In
42 Id.
43 Id. at 543.
44 324 U.S. 652, 657 (1945). (Imported hemp stored in original package by
importer, and not used for the purpose for which it was imported, held immune from
state taxation.)
45 358 U.S. 534, 542 (1959).
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such a case, the goods would have still been imports46 and, before
Michelin, not taxable. The Court in Youngstown stated:
Breaking the original package is only one of the ways by which
packaged goods that have been imported .. .may lose. their distinctive
character as imports ... That the package has not been broken is,
therefore, only one of the several factors to be considered in factually
determining whether the goods are being 'used for the purpose for which
they were imported.' [citation omitted]
47
The protection of imported goods from discriminatory ad valorem
property taxes, as announced in Michelin, may extend to situations
where, formerly, taxation was permitted under the Youngstown and
Hooven tests with respect to goods which were no longer classified as
imports. The Court in Michelin pointed to a common characteristic
shared by cases which met the Youngstown and Hooven tests and cases
which met the Michelin test: "that they [taxes] cannot be selectively
imposed and increased so as substantially to impair or prohibit
importation. 48 The Court admitted, in a.footnote, that discriminatory
taxation could occur after the goods lost their protection as imports
under the Youngstown and Hooven tests:
For example, a State could pass a law which only taxed the retail sale
of imported goods, while the retail sale of domestic goods was not taxed.
Such a tax, even though operating after an 'initial sale' of the imports
would, of course, be invalidated as a discriminatory imposition that was,
in practical effect, an impost.
49
Thus, a tax which is discriminatory under the rationale of Michelin
is invalid even if the imported items had lost their classification as
imports when taxed. Since the North Carolina import classification
statute inhibits the free flow of imported goods among the states, it
violates the purposes of the import-export clause regardless of whether
the goods were removed from their original packages, were put to the
use for which they were imported or were initially sold before they
were stored in North Carolina.
The North Carolina case most relevant to this discussion is Wilson
v. County of Wake, 50 decided in 1973. In Wilson, imported auto parts had
been segregated from the entire shipment and subsequently repacked
while still in their original containers. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the taxpayer, a wholesale distributor, had not
broken the original package so as to make the parts taxable for ad
valorem property tax purposes. The county claimed that the goods had
been put to the use for which they were imported and that the
46 Id. at 544.
47 Id. at 548-49.
48 96 S. Ct. at 542.
49 Id. at 542 n.7.
50 19 N.C. App. 536, 199 S.E.2d 665 (1973).
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Youngstown test applied so as to permit taxation. However, the court
distinguished Youngstown and other cases on the ground that they
dealt with manufacturing importation, "and as such do not apply to
the case at bar."'5 1 The Wilson case, insofar as it relied on Low v. Austin,
supra, for the proposition that any import, as long as it retains the
status of an import, is immune from state taxation, is clearly wrong,
since Michelin explicitly overruled that proposition.
Further, the Wilson court seems to have distinguished the
Hooven-Youngstown cases with a less than enlightening discussion. The
stored goods in Wilson were available for filling orders (the purpose for
which they were imported) in the same way that the ore in Youngstown
was available for use in steel manufacture. The fact that one business
dealt with manufacture and the other dealt with distribution would not
seem to make their supplies any less a part of the general mass of
property within the state.
C-2. Exports
Since Michelin involved only imports, there is presently no case
which holds that a nondiscriminatory property tax on exports does not
violate the import-export clause. Thus, there is a possibility that the
law of exports is still governed by Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co.,
where the United States Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe prohibition on taxation contained in the Import-Export Clause
is absolute; no duties or imposts are allowed 'except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing [a state's] inspection Laws.' Con-
sequently, the essential question in cases involving the Clause is a narrow
one: is the property upon which a tax has been sought to be imposed an
'export' and thus entitled to protection under the provision's literal
terms?
52
In National Cash Register the taxpayer had built data processing
machines suitable for use only in foreign countries and had stored the
component machines in anticipation of their shipment abroad. The
Court held the machines taxable on the ground that the exemption
from taxation in the import-export clause attached to exports and not
to goods awaiting export. The Court cited Empresa Siderurgica v. County
of Merced53 for the criterion establishing when a good becomes an
export:
[I]t is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a plan which
contemplates exportation, or an integrated series of events which will end
with it. ... It is the entrance of the articles into the export stream that
marks the start of the process of exportation. Then there is certainty that
:I Id. at 541, 199 S.E.2d at 668.
52 417 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1974).
53 337 U.S. 154, 156-157 (1949).
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the goods are headed for their foreign destination and will not be diverted
to domestic use.
54
Leaving Michelin aside, it is clear that under National Cash Register,
stored goods awaiting export are taxable under the.- import-export
clause (regardless of whether the tax is discriminatory) simply because
the stored goods are not exports. This result adheres even if, as in
National Cash Register, the goods are totally unsuitable for domestic
consumption. Thus, the North Carolina export classification statute
would not violate the import-export clause.
Looking at Michelin, however, the bases for prohibiting dis-
criminatory taxation of stored goods after importation are equally
applicable to stored goods awaiting export: to allow Congress to
control foreign commerce and the corresponding duties, and to assure
that non-port states suffer a tax burden not in excess of that charged to
port-state residents for use of the same ports. Thus, assuming that the
North Carolina export classification statute classifies stored goods
awaiting export as non-taxable only if they are to be exported through
North Carolina ports, see discussion supra, the reasoning of Michelin
logically extends to exports as well as to imports. In such case, the
North Carolina export classification statute violates the import-export
clause.
D. Procedural Problems in Bringing an Action Challenging the Classification
Statute
D-1. Who may bring the suit - Standing
In Appeal of Martin55 taxpayer shipped goods in sealed cartons
marked "for transshipment" to a warehouse in Mecklenburg County.
As purchase orders were received, taxpayer would instruct the
warehouse to ship specified cartons to the ultimate consignee. The
taxpayer claimed that the predecessor of N.C. Gen. Stat. §105-275(10)
(Cum. Supp. 1975) exempted the stored cartons from taxation. The
county claimed that the property was not held for transshipment and
thus was not within the statute's classification, and that the statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional requirement that
property be taxed by a uniform rule. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that the property fell within the classification statute
5 6
and that the county lacked standing to challenge the statute because it
was not a member of the class subject to the alleged discrimination.
One recognized exception to this rule allows an affected party to allege
discrimination when no member of a class subject to the alleged discrimi-
nation is in a position to raise the constitutional question. [citations
54 417 U.S. 62, 68 (1974).
55 286 N.C. 66, 209 S.E.2d 766 (1974).
56 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-275(10) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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omitted] The taxpayers of this State who are members of the class and
subject to the alleged discrimination here asserted by Mecklenburg
County are under no such disability. [citations omitted]
5 7
Thus, according to this case, any individual taxpayer in the county or
city where the exemption is applicable has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the exemption since it has the effect of making him
bear a greater portion of the tax burden.
5 8
The federal courts are apparently not bound to follow state rules of
standing and must reach their decision without regard to the state law
on the matter.5 9 A complete discussion of federal standing criteria,
dealing with challenges to state taxation statutes, is beyond the scope
of this article; however, it appears that the two most authoritative cases
on taxpayer's standing, Frothingham v. Mellon 60 and Flast v. Cohen
61
have stated in dicta "... that state and municipal taxpayers have,
standing to sue to enjoin state officials from enforcing allegedly
unconstitutional statutes. 62 In addition there must be actual monetary
injury in order to have standing. 63 As the Martin case indicates, a tax
burden which is relieved by an exemption must correspondingly be
assumed by the taxpayers in the taxing unit.
D-2. Where must the suit be brought - Jurisdiction
The United States District Courts cannot "enjoin, suspend, or
restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State."' 64 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the procedure set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat.
§105-267 (1972) is the exclusive and appropriate method for testing the
constitutionality of a statute, because the law does not contemplate
administrative review of constitutional questions. 65 The United States
Supreme Court also has held that the predecessor to the above North
Carolina statute provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at
law; a suit would not lie in the federal courts to enjoin the collection of
a North Carolina state tax. 66
57 In re Appeal of Martin, 286 N.C. 66, 75, 209 S.E.2d 766, 773 (1974).
58 J. FERRELL, PROPERTY TAX BULLETIN No. 43 at 5-7 (Institute of Government,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 3, 1975).
s9 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (1970).
60 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
61 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
62 Carlsbad Union School District of San Diego County v. Rafferty, 300 F.Supp.
434, 441 (S.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1970).
63 Id.
64 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
65 267 N.C. 15, 20, 147 S.E.2d 522 (1966).
66 Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121 (1930); Catholic Society of
Religious and Literary Education v. Madison County, 74 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1935).
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N.C. Gen. Stat. §105-276 (1972) requires the taxpayer who asserts
the invalidity of a tax charged against him to pay the tax and, within
thirty days of payment, to seek a refund of the tax from the Commis-
sioner of Revenue, if a state tax, or from the treasurer of a county or
city, if a county or city tax. If the tax is not refunded within ninety days
after demand, the taxpayer may sue either the Commissioner of
Revenue, if a state tax, or the city, county, or town imposing the tax, if
not a state tax. The case, once heard by the state court of last resort, is
subject to review by the United States Supreme Court - by appeal, if
the state court upholds the constitutionality of the statute, and by
certiorari, if the state court finds the statute unconstitutional. 67 Thus,
in challenging the import-export classification statute, the suit must be
brought in state court against the county, city, or town imposing the
tax.
D-3. What kind of relief is possible - Remedy
Common sense dictates that no plaintiff will sue to eliminate an
exemption received by other taxpayers when the increase in plaintiff's
tax burden is insignificant compared to the litigation costs of challeng-
ing the exemption. No plaintiff will bring a suit to eliminate an
exemption from which he benefits, no matter how certain its uncon-
stitutionality may be.
In Richmond Food Stores v. Jones,68 plaintiff, a non-resident dis-
tributor of soft drinks, challenged an alternative method of paying the
North Carolina Soft Drink Tax on the ground that this was available
only to resident distributors. In essence, the resident distributors could
pay the tax on a monthly basis - without affixing tax stamps or
tax-paid crowns on the bottles - at one half cent per bottle for the first
fifteen thousand bottles sold annually and one cent per bottle for all
additional bottles with an eight percent rebate of the tax. Non-resident
distributors were required to affix tax-paid stamps or crowns on all
bottles and pay a tax of one cent per bottle. The Court of Appeals of
North Carolina held that the alternative method available to resident
distributors discriminated against interstate commerce; but, instead of
holding the alternative method void, the court held that the word
"resident" in the alternative method was void and of no effect. Thus,
the non-resident distributor was entitled to use the alternative method
and achieve a lesser tax burden.
The same type of remedy would be appropriate for an owner or
warehouseman of goods stored in North Carolina and imported or
exported through non-North Carolina ports. The words in the North
Carolina import-export classification statute which indicate that the
goods must be imported or exported through a North Carolina port
67 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970).
68 22 N.C. App. 272, 206 S.E.2d 346 (1974).
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could be eliminated, leaving the statute completely nondiscriminatory
under both the commerce clause and the import-export clause.
E. Summary
This article supports the contention that N.C. Gen. Stat. §105-
275(1-2)(Cum. Supp. 1975) places a discriminatory ad valorem tax
burden on goods that are imported or exported through ports other
than those located in North Carolina. The statute therefore violates the
commerce clause, the import-export clause as it applies to imports, and
perhaps the import-export clause as it applies to exports. Any finan-
cially affected taxpayer within the same taxing unit as persons receiv-
ing the exemption classification has standing to bring the action. The
action can be brought only in state court and only after following
special statutory tax claim procedures. The action could recover, as a
remedy, the same tax classification for stored property imported or
exported through ports outside of North Carolina as similar property-.
imported through North Carolina ports now receives.
